There’s a persistent myth doing the rounds in tactical circles that the number ten is extinct - that the positional demands of modern pressing systems have simply made the role unworkable. It’s a clean narrative, and it’s largely wrong.
What’s actually happened is more mundane. Clubs stopped building squads capable of housing a genuine ten. The position requires specific conditions: a double pivot that can carry the defensive load, wide players disciplined enough to track back without being asked to create everything, and - most importantly - a striker who can hold a line and work in combination rather than press from the front alone. That’s an expensive, coordinated set of decisions. It’s far easier to deploy a high-energy 4-3-3 and tell the press release it’s “modern football.”
The evidence that the ten still functions at the highest level isn’t hard to find. Jude Bellingham operating in that half-space role at Real Madrid - technically a floating eight, but functionally a ten in attacking phases - consistently generates chances from exactly the areas a classical number ten would occupy. Granit Xhaka at Bayer Leverkusen under Xabi Alonso showed that even a defensive midfielder reframed as a progressive passer could replicate the connective tissue a ten provides. These aren’t accidents. They’re clubs that built the surrounding structure first.
The squad-building failure is the actual story

Most mid-table Premier League clubs don’t have a double pivot that can defend without help. They don’t have a striker who holds up play. So they collapse to a shape that distributes defensive responsibility more evenly - and the ten vanishes not because the position is tactically obsolete but because the infrastructure was never there to support it.
This is where the “death of the ten” argument gets things backwards. Pep Guardiola didn’t kill the ten. He killed bad tens - players who didn’t press, didn’t track, didn’t contribute without the ball. The role itself was absorbed and redistributed, not deleted.
What gets lost
The cost is real, even if clubs don’t account for it. A genuine ten - someone who can receive between the lines under pressure and play a ball through a defensive shape in a single touch - provides something that positional rotations don’t fully replicate. The creativity-on-demand quality, the ability to solve a set defensive block with individual decision-making rather than collective movement, is rarer now precisely because fewer players are trained or deployed in the conditions that develop it.
Clubs aren’t victims of tactical evolution here. They made choices. The position is still viable. The patience to build around it isn’t.