Switching everything sounds smart until you realise it’s been used as a substitute for actually teaching players how to guard someone. For the better part of a decade, the league-wide drift toward switch-heavy schemes has been sold as adaptability - a way to neutralise pick-and-roll actions and keep mobile defenders in front of ball-handlers. What it’s actually done is produce a generation of NBA players who don’t know how to fight through a screen.

The logic made sense early on. When Golden State was running Draymond Green as a roving defensive anchor, switching worked because Draymond was genuinely capable of guarding one through five. The problem is that most teams saw the outcome and copied the method without having the personnel. Switching requires every player on the floor to be a credible one-on-one defender across multiple positions. Very few rosters actually have that. What they have instead are wings who can switch onto a guard for two dribbles before getting blown by, and bigs who can switch onto a shooter before giving up an open catch-and-shoot three because they’re still recovering their stance.

The more corrosive effect is what it’s done to individual defensive development. When a team’s default answer to any screen is “switch it,” young players never learn to navigate screens properly. They don’t develop the anticipation to go under a screen without giving up a pull-up. They don’t learn how to fight through contact. Those are skills that require repetition in practice and live situations - and if the scheme removes the situation, the skill never gets built.

This is visible in playoff basketball more than anywhere else. Good offensive teams in the postseason have spent years finding the specific mismatches that switching creates and attacking them systematically. It’s not subtle. It’s not even surprising anymore. Coaches know it’s coming and still don’t have an answer because their players literally haven’t practiced the alternative.

There’s also a conditioning element that rarely gets discussed. Switching demands constant communication and rotation awareness over 48 minutes. Teams that do it well - Boston under Mazzulla has been one example - have built that into their defensive culture at every level. Teams that bolt it on as a tactical convenience are just delaying the moment when their rotations break down in the fourth quarter.

The irony is that the schemes switching was designed to beat - the heavy pick-and-roll, the strong-side isolation - are coming back, partly because they’ve become the most reliable way to attack a switching defense. The teams that can actually guard without switching now hold a structural advantage that will only grow.