The attacking midfielder hasn’t disappeared from football. It’s just that most Premier League managers have built teams that functionally delete them - and then clubs spend £60 million replacing the last one who got deleted.
The cycle is genuinely strange to watch. A creative no. 10 arrives with a reputation built in a different league, usually under a manager who trusted the position to receive between the lines, dictate tempo, and drift. Eighteen months later, they’re being described as “not a Premier League player,” which is a phrase that means nothing tactically but lands with enough authority to stick.
What actually happens is more specific. Most top-half Premier League sides now press with their front three in a structure that demands wide players cover enormous defensive ground. That system doesn’t leave room for a player sitting centrally at 35 metres - which is where a genuine no. 10 lives. Managers either retrain them as an eight, which removes the very thing they were bought for, or they leave the player exposed when possession is lost, which creates the defensive liability that gets them dropped.
Bruno Fernandes has survived this longer than almost anyone because he was re-engineered into something more combative under Ten Hag’s early United, and because he produces output that overrides tactical inconvenience. But he’s an exception, not a template.
The Actual Problem Is Recruitment, Not the Position

Clubs are still scouting no. 10s based on what they produce in their current system - the through-balls, the turns, the goal contributions in a side that’s built around them. That’s the wrong frame entirely. The relevant question is whether they can produce those things when the team is pressing at 60% intensity with two banks of four sitting behind them. Most clubs don’t have a clean answer.
Lazio’s Alberto Villa, Napoli under Conte, Real Sociedad - these environments produce technically gifted players who are then purchased by clubs with completely incompatible pressing blueprints. The player’s output collapses not because their quality declined but because the structural assumptions underneath them vanished on arrival.
The Short Version
Premier League clubs aren’t bad at developing no. 10s. They’re bad at deciding, before the fee clears, whether their actual system has a slot for one.
Until that question gets asked honestly at the recruitment stage rather than rationalised around in the second season, the position will keep getting blamed for what is fundamentally a planning failure.